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This paper assesses the design and use of protection orders for domestic violence in England 
and Wales. It draws on data from 400 police domestic violence incidents and 65 interviews 
with victims/survivors, as well as new analysis of government justice data from England and 
Wales, to address a gap in literature on protection orders. 
 
The paper identifies an increasing civil-criminal ‘hybridisation’ of protection orders in 
England and Wales, and argues that a dual regime has developed, with orders issued by 
police and/or in criminal proceedings increasingly privileged (and enforced) over victim-led 
civil orders. Whilst protection orders are being used – as intended – flexibly to protect 
domestic violence victims, the way they are applied in practice risks downgrading domestic 
violence in criminal justice terms.  
 
The conclusions are especially timely in light of current Government proposals to rationalise 
protection orders by introducing a single overarching Domestic Abuse Protection Order in 
England and Wales. 
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In England and Wales, civil orders to protect victims of domestic violence have been in use 
since 1976.  There are six main behavioural protection orders for interpersonal and family 
violence currently in use in England and Wales: restraining orders (RO), non-molestation 
orders (NMO), occupation orders (OO), Domestic Violence Protection Orders (DVPO), 
Forced Marriage Protection Orders (FMPO) and Female Genital Mutilation Protection Orders 
(FGMPO). These orders are explained in more detail in the sections which follow. This paper 
focuses on ROs, NMOs and DVPOs, as the key orders for domestic violence. OOs have been 
in steady decline since 2003 and have, to some extent, been replaced by DVPOs: these 
orders, and related questions concerned with occupancy and residency in the marital home, 
are not examined in detail in this paper. Whilst ROs, NMOs and DVPOs are all preventative 
orders, requiring or prohibiting certain behaviours of the person they address, a key 
difference is whether they are issued as part of criminal or civil proceedings, which governs 
the circumstances in which they can be issued, and therefore who can apply for them, grant 
them and how they may be enforced.  
 
Over the past two decades there has been a shift in emphasis in the design of protection 
orders - from being purely civil law measures, towards orders being increasingly issued as 
part of criminal proceedings, and by criminal justice agents (police officers). Over time, this 
has resulted in a proliferation of different protection orders, and in the ‘hybridisation’ of 
criminal and civil measures to protect victims from domestic abuse. There is a gap in the 
academic and policy review literature for an assessment of the consequences of this shift – an 
assessment which is particularly timely now, since the Government has made proposals to 
introduce a new, overarching protection order for domestic abuse. Domestic Abuse 
Protection Orders are included in the Domestic Abuse Bill introduced on 16 July 2019. The 
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Government intends these new orders to replace DVPN/DVPOs immediately, and NMOs and 
ROs in domestic abuse cases over time (Home Office, 2019). 
 
Background 
The design of existing protection orders 
Restraining Orders 
Restraining Orders (ROs), issued under section 5 of the Protection from Harassment Act 
(PHA) 1997,  are civil orders granted by a judge in criminal proceedings following a 
conviction (or acquittal) on a criminal charge. Thus, whilst the standard of evidence for 
issuing an RO is civil, they can only be made where a criminal charge has been brought. 
Victims themselves do not apply for orders, nor do they need to consent to one being made. 
ROs prevent domestic violence, stalking and harassment by prohibiting contact, prohibiting 
violence, intimidation and harassment, and banning the offender from certain places. They 
usually last between six and 12 months but can be made for an indefinite period and are 
renewable. Breach is a criminal offence with a power of arrest, and can be heard in either 
Magistrates or Crown courts. Prior to 2009, ROs were only issued (under PHA 1997) on 
conviction for harassment offences. In 2009 (bringing in provisions made in the Domestic 
Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004), ROs were extended to allow judges to issue them on 
conviction for any offence (not only harassment), and on acquittal for some offences. The 
Government argued that this extension was necessary because there were cases in which 
there had been ‘clear evidence’ during proceedings that a victim needed protection, but 
insufficient evidence to convict (Hansard (HL) col GC, February 2, 2004). Early evaluations 
of this widening of circumstances in which ROs could be issued suggested that professionals 
saw the extension of ROs as the measure in the 2004 Act which would potentially have the 




Non-molestation orders (NMOs), issued under Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996, are 
applied for by the victim in civil proceedings (with or without a solicitor). The standard of 
evidence for issuing an NMO is civil, and victims can decide to apply for an order themselves 
– there is no requirement for criminal charge or proceedings (Rights of Women, 2015; 
Ashworth and Zedner, 2014). As with ROs, they aim to prevent domestic violence, stalking 
and harassment by preventing the offender from contacting the victim and/or attending 
certain places. In 2007 they were extended to a wider range of subjects (relatives and same-
sex couples as well as heterosexual intimate partners), and breach of an order was 
criminalised, with an automatic power of arrest. Their duration is variable but usually under 
one year; this is extendable.  
 
Domestic Violence Protection Orders 
Domestic Violence Protection Notices (DVPN) and Orders (DVPO) were introduced in the 
Crime and Security Act 2010, and brought into force nationally in 2014. They were intended 
as an additional protection measure, granted by the police on-the-spot to offer immediate 
protection to victims in the aftermath of a domestic violence incident, whilst other avenues – 
which might include criminal charges, civil orders, or victim support – were investigated. 
This new measure filled a gap identified by the police and taken up by government (Kelly et 
al., 2013). DVPN and DVPOs are issued by the police on the basis of the police determining 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe the suspect has been violent or has threatened 
violence towards an associated person, and that the order is necessary to protect that person 
from violence or threat of violence – thus the victim does not have to consent or apply 
themselves (College of Policing, 2015). The DVPN has immediate effect, lasts 48 hours, and 
prohibits the perpetrator from molesting the victim; it may also evict them from premises or 
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restrict their ability to enter those premises. Police then have to apply to a magistrates’ court 
for a DVPO, which lasts for 28 days. Thus, this order is effectively an emergency non-
molestation and eviction notice (like an occupation order), with the distinction that it is the 
police who decide to apply it, it has immediate effect, and limited duration. The DVPO has a 
power of arrest attached, so police can arrest for breach – but breach is a civil contempt of 
court. Government guidance is clear that DVPOs should not be seen as an alternative to 
criminal charge – however, they are envisaged in circumstances where an arrest and charge is 
not immediately possible: “where no other enforceable restrictions can be placed upon the 
perpetrator” (Home Office 2016a, section 2.4). Police are required, in their application for a 
DVPO, to justify why the prevention of further violence cannot be achieved by other means, 
e.g. bail conditions, and strongly encouraged in police guidance to avoid using them in high 
risk cases or in cases where a criminal charge can be brought (College of Policing, 2015).  
 
New proposals: Domestic Abuse Protection Orders 
The Government is proposing, via the Domestic Abuse Bill currently before Parliament, to 
rationalise the existing protection order regime by introducing a new Domestic Abuse 
Protection Notice (DAPN) and Order (DAPO). These will replicate DVPOs by giving victims 
immediate protection following an incident, and being issued by police. However, they will 
address perceived shortcomings in the current orders, namely their limited duration (28 days) 
and the fact that breach is not a criminal offence. The Government proposes that DAPOs will 
offer more comprehensive and flexible protection because it will be possible for a wider 
range of applicants (victims, police, relevant third parties) to apply for the order in different 
courts (civil, criminal).  Courts will be able to make an order of their own volition, to 
determine the appropriate duration, and to vary the conditions. It will be possible to make 
positive requirements (e.g. to attend a perpetrator programme) as well as prohibitions, and to 
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electronically monitor perpetrator compliance. Breach will be a criminal offence, with a 
maximum sentence of five years, though it can also be dealt with as contempt of court. At 
present these proposals are only in draft form but, if the Bill is adopted, they have the 
potential to significantly change the landscape of protection orders: the Home Office 
envisages that they will become the ‘go-to’ protection order for domestic abuse, with 55,000 
issued each year (Home Office, 2019). 
 
A shift towards criminalisation  
Since the 1990s there has been increasing criminalisation of domestic violence, echoing a 
shift from its perception as a ‘private’ matter between applicant and respondent, to a ‘public’ 
matter, in which the police are automatically expected to play a role (Hester 2006, Burton 
2010). There has been a parallel shift towards blurring the boundaries of criminal and civil 
law remedies and the development of hybrid civil-criminal remedies. Hitchings (2005) 
identifies this trend as starting with criminalisation of breach of the civil ASBO order in 
1998. This ‘hybridisation’ is particularly obvious in protection orders for domestic violence, 
with the criminalisation (via the 2004 Domestic Violence Crimes and Victims Act, coming 
into force in 2007) of breach of civil NMOs (Hester, Westmarland, Pearce and Williamson, 
2008). The same pattern has been adopted with subsequent civil protection orders for forced 
marriage (Forced Marriage Protection Order, FMPO), which were brought in in 2007 but 
breach only criminalised in 2014, and female genital mutilation (Female Genital Mutilation 
Protection Order, FGMPO), breach of which was criminalised from introduction in 2015. The 
criminalisation of breach in the design of orders is significant, since it shifts the enforcement 
of non-compliance with an order from the victim (via the civil courts) to the police, and 
means that if the abuser breaks any of the conditions of the order they can be arrested without 
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any need to return to court, whilst still leaving an option for the victim to apply for a warrant 
of arrest or committal order in the family court if the police do not pursue a charge. 
 
Criminalisation of breach of civil orders is not without controversy. The standard of proof for 
civil proceedings is on the balance of probabilities, whereas in criminal cases it is beyond 
reasonable doubt (House of Commons Library, 2004). During the passage of the 2004 Act 
there was considerable parliamentary debate about the effective introduction by the back door 
of a (lesser) civil burden of proof in criminal processes, by criminalising breach. There are 
other concerns, too, about hybridisation; for instance, that availability of quasi-criminal 
measures may deter the police from pursuing substantive criminal charges. There is some 
evidence that police are already using short-term summary tools at their disposal to ‘manage’ 
domestic violence – such as arrest and release without action, or breach of the peace – 
particularly where a couple remain together or the victim is ‘non-cooperative’ (Hester, 2003; 
Westmarland et al., 2018). On the other hand, victims may be less likely to apply for orders 
such as NMOs because they fear criminalising their partners and/or not having the choice 
themselves. Victims’ advocates have argued that civil law empowers victims by giving them 
choice in how and when they can access protection, and conversely, that police and courts 
issuing orders without the need for victim consent may mark the dis-empowerment of 
victims, by criminalising their partners when police enforce breach – even if this was not 
what the victim wanted (Barron, 1990; Hitchings, 2005). 
 
So, we find a picture in England and Wales, in 2019, where a multiplicity of protection orders 
exist for domestic violence. Some (e.g. occupation orders) are fully civil, meaning the victim 
must apply in civil court proceedings for an order (and for a power of arrest to be attached). 
Unless the court has attached a power of arrest, the victim must return to the court to 
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demonstrate breach and apply for a warrant of arrest. Others (e.g. restraining orders) are 
issued by the courts in criminal proceedings following a charge and trial (whether convicted 
or acquitted), and any breach is automatically criminal and enforceable by police. Many, 
though, straddle a hybrid continuum in-between, being part civil and part criminal – this 
applies to NMOs, FMPOs and FGMPOs, all of which are orders made in civil proceedings 
but where breach is a criminal offence, therefore enforceable by the police; and DVPOs, 
which are police-issued and where breach is a criminal offence.  
 
Influences on the use of different orders  
There is a discernible gap in the literature for work which assesses how the overall design 
and use of different protection orders in England and Wales have changed over the past 
decade or so. This is especially important in light of significant cuts to legal aid from April 
2013, when changes in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
came into force meaning that applicants for legal aid had to meet more stringent financial 
eligibility criteria; and of continuing cuts to police resourcing, with the number of police 
officers having fallen from 146,411 in March 2010 to 125,820 in March 2017 (Home Office, 
2017). Whilst there are articles and inspection reports which review or evaluate specific 
orders (Hester et al., 2008; Platt, 2008; Kelly et al., 2013; HMICFRS, 2017), there are few 
which assess the overall coherence of the protection order regime, especially looking across 
civil and criminal processes. Moreover, articles which do address the overarching picture 
tend to be either non-recent (Burton, 2010; Edwards, 2001 and 2006; Hitchings, 2005), or 
outside the English and Welsh context (Capshaw and McNeece, 2000; Burgess-Proctor, 




Several studies in England and Wales between 2008 and 2010 suggested an initial downturn 
in use of NMOs following the criminalisation of breach (Hester et al., 2008; Platt, 2008; 
Burton, 2010). Platt found a 15-30% decrease in applications for the orders across six county 
courts in the six months following implementation, and judges across the country reported an 
‘immediate and sharp drop in the number of applications’ (Platt, 2008, p.643). Hester et al. 
(2008) found a 10% fall in applications for NMOs, and 20% fall in NMOs made in the year 
following implementation. Hester et al. and Platt both recognise that their analyses were 
based on initial data from a period of less than one year after the changes, and emphasise that 
those data were too short-term to draw conclusions about trends. Burton (2010) was 
commissioned by the Legal Services Commission (LSC) to examine possible reasons for a 
decline in the number of applicants for funding to pursue civil law remedies for domestic 
violence. She found a similar picture, with LSC certificates for funding dropping in the year 
post 2007 implementation of the changes to NMOs. All these papers point to a range of 
reasons including confusion amongst police, judges, solicitors and victims’ agencies in 
adjusting to the new regime, lack of availability of legal aid, but principally suggest it may 
reflect a reluctance of victims to criminalise their partners (Platt, 2008; Hester et al., 2008; 
Burton, 2010).  
 
Further concerns were raised about the effects on access to NMOs of cuts to legal aid 
introduced in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO), 
which came into force in April 2013. Although there was a continuing exemption for 
applicants for domestic abuse and forced marriage injunctions, the Act made it harder for all 
applicants to qualify financially for legal aid, by ending the practice of uprating the gross 
income means-test in line with inflation, introducing a new capital means test, and increasing 
financial contributions required from those who did qualify (Law Society of England and 
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Wales, 2017). Domestic abuse campaigners expressed fears that these changes meant that 
“women affected by violence with very low incomes are often required to make unaffordable 
contributions towards their legal aid” (Rights of Women, 2018).  
 
At the same time, there was criticism from other quarters that, since a NMO was now an 
accepted form of evidence to prove domestic abuse to qualify for legal aid in family law 
cases, this might invite exploitation, with solicitors applying for orders on the basis of false 
allegations of abuse in order to win legal aid for their clients in family proceedings (Mason, 
2016). More neutrally, legal commentators predicted a rise in applications for NMOs as a 
result of LASPO, as people who had good grounds for an order might be more likely to apply 
for one in order to get legal aid evidence, when previously they might have chosen not to 
apply for an order (Hunter, 2011). 
 
A 2017 police inspectorate report found that ‘many forces are still not using DVPOs as 
widely as they could, and opportunities to use them continue to be missed’ (Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS), 2017, p.25). Police 
inspections identified several reasons for their underuse, including: officer inexperience in 
using them (in some forces the application process sat with specialist domestic violence 
teams so other officers were not aware of them), a lack of officer training on how to use 
them, orders being seen as too bureaucratic or the paperwork being too time-consuming 
(especially when building a case for charge in parallel), and varying force policies, including 
only using DVPOs in high-risk cases (HMIC, 2014; HMIC, 2015; HMICFRS, 2017).  
 
Breach and enforcement  
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The effectiveness of a protection order relies on the threat of consequences for breach 
(Douglas, 2008). The police are best placed to monitor compliance with the conditions of 
protection orders, for instance by means of electronic monitoring, keeping contact with the 
victim, or patrolling the area (Logar and Niemi, 2017). But international research has found 
multiple problems with police enforcement of protection orders (Burgess-Proctor, 2008). In 
studies in Canada and the US, police officers were more likely to arrest for breach if there 
were signs of a struggle and/or physical violence (Rigakos, 1997; Chaudhuri and Daly, 
1992). This is reflected in Sentencing Guidelines for England and Wales for breach of 
protection orders, which privileges physical violence (Sentencing Council, 2018). In terms of 
charges brought for breach, an Australian study of 645 court files of prosecutions for breach 
of domestic violence orders in Queensland, found that many of the matters charged as 
breaches of protection orders could have been charged as criminal offences, including assault 
or criminal damage, offences which would have carried higher penalties than the breach 
offence (Douglas, 2008). It concluded that breach charges often failed to reflect the 
seriousness of the offence, and that breaches were prosecuted where it was difficult to satisfy 
the burden of proof in relation to a more serious criminal offence. In some cases, she noted, 
these decisions may have reflected the non-cooperation of women in pursuing criminal 
charges. However, she also found that penalties were often inappropriate and very low for 
breach – often lower-order fines. One critical finding was that defendants in breach 
prosecutions were less likely to plead guilty than for other offences: 59% compared with 74% 
in all criminal cases. However, the same proportion were found guilty of the breach offence 
as for all criminal cases (Douglas, 2008). This provides compelling evidence that domestic 
violence perpetrators charged with lower-level breach offences rather than criminal offences 
for an incident are more likely to contest the charge, and to receive lower order sentences. 
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Domestic abuse practitioners and victims surveyed by the police inspectorate in England and 
Wales reported dismay at the lack of action taken for breach of civil orders and bail 
conditions, in particular of DVPOs (HMIC, 2015; HMICFRS, 2017). The inspectorate found 
examples of victims reporting multiple breaches to police before any action was taken, which 
they said had had a detrimental effect on their confidence in the police, and delays in 
responding to breach. In some cases, officers waited for the perpetrator to return on bail at a 
later date to deal with the breach (HMICFRS, 2017). Practitioners interviewed reported that 
breaches were not always recorded by the police. As a result, the inspectorate concluded, 
‘breaches are not always reaching court and these measures are at risk of becoming a 
“toothless instrument”’ (HMIC 2015, p.59).  
 
Police can only act on breach of a protective order if they know it exists. As well as police 
needing to know what actions would constitute a breach of an order to be practically able to 
enforce it, there is a more fundamental point. For an order to be valid, there is a formal 
requirement that the subject it addresses must be aware that it exists. This means an order has 
to be formally served on the respondent, and the police need then to be notified of the order 
and that it has been formally served on the respondent before they can act: “proof of service 
means that orders can be enforced” (Family Justice Council, 2011, p.2).  
 
This does not seem to be happening systematically. A consequence of reductions in legal aid 
and an increase in litigants in person has meant that this step is being missed out – victims or 
their solicitors are not always notifying the police that an order has been made, and/or there is 
no formal statement made to the police that the order has been properly served (Domestic 
Abuse Matters, 2014). There seems to be a further problem with police routinely not 
recording the existence of orders in a timely manner. For instance, an investigation into 
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handling of NMOs in one force found delays in recording orders on police systems which left 
the victim unprotected; and front office staff unsure what to do with an order when a process 
server provided a copy of the order (Domestic Abuse Matters, 2014).  
 
Steps have been taken at the police and courts levels to address this issue. For instance, one 
police force has developed a detailed protocol setting out how the courts will communicate 
orders made with the force (via email to a central address) and who will enter the details on 
the force systems (Sussex Police Partnership, 2016). In 2018, then President of the Family 
Division, Sir James Munby, issued a new Practice Direction 36H which came into force in 
July 2018 for a twelve-month pilot. Under this scheme, the courts communicated orders made 
with a central police email address, which in turn communicated to forces (Practice Direction 
36H – Pilot Scheme, Procedure for Service of Certain Protection Orders on the Police, 2018). 
This scheme has just ended and lessons for practice are under review. 
 
Methods 
This paper draws on data from three sources. Firstly, new analysis of data reported by the 
Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) on the use of ROs and 
NMOs over time. Data were collected from official statistics and publications, in particular: 
the annual CPS Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) reports (containing MoJ data 
on ROs issued, MoJ and CPS data on prosecutions for breaches of ROs and NMOS, and MoJ 
data on convictions for breach of ROs), MoJ Family Court Statistics Quarterly (courts data on 
NMOs issued), and reports of the police inspectorate for England and Wales, Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS; previously HMIC) (data 




Secondly, analysis of police data collected as part of a wider research project [name removed 
for anonymity] involving 400 police-flagged domestic violence incidents reported to two 
English forces between May and November 2014, and tracked to criminal justice outcome. 
This dataset was explored for information on ROs, NMOs and DVPN/DVPOs, to see if 
quantitative analysis could be conducted. Eight out of 400 cases positively recorded a 
protection order associated with the case. Key variables in these cases were examined in 
Excel including case summary, victim and perpetrator demographics, prior and subsequent 
incidents, risk assessment, criminal charge and conviction and the nature of the orders.  
 
Thirdly, a sub-group analysis was conducted of 251 interviews conducted with victim-
survivors of gender-based violence for the same research project. All interviewees were 
asked about their experiences of different forms of gender-based violence (e.g. domestic 
violence, rape, forced marriage, FGM), and their use of criminal and civil justice systems. 
They were asked whether they had used a range of protection orders for domestic violence 
issued by civil or criminal courts, and about their views on using such orders. In total 65 
interviewees said they had had one or more protection orders. Interviews did not tend to 
contain detailed information about the application and issuing of orders, since these questions 
formed only part of a wider-ranging interview, but victim-survivors did talk about the context 
in which orders were made, whether and how the orders were effective, and experiences of 
breach. These 65 interviews were coded and thematically analysed in NVivo. 
 
Findings and discussion 
Analysis of police cases and victim interviews for the project, combined with new secondary 
analysis of MoJ and CPS data, shows that the main protection orders for domestic violence 
are ROs and NMOs, which continue to be in demand in England and Wales. By design, 
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protection orders for domestic violence are becoming increasingly hybrid, with most civil 
orders now containing an automatic power of arrest for breach, and thus criminal and civil 
options being more closely woven together. Yet in parallel, the enforcement of orders issued 
in criminal and civil proceedings are diverging, with some evidence that ROs are being 
privileged over NMOs in terms of criminal justice enforcement. This is having an effect of 
downgrading the criminal severity with which some domestic violence incidents are being 
treated - in keeping with a wider tendency for the CJS to downgrade DV as identified by 
Westmarland et al. (2018). 
 
Restraining orders issued in criminal proceedings  
Restraining orders are frequently issued in cases charged with non harassment and stalking 
offences 
Figure 1 shows a steady increase in the number of restraining orders, issued in criminal 
proceedings, since 2011, although there was a downturn in the last year for which data are 
available (a drop of 16% from 2016 to 2017). Table 1 shows that ROs are being issued in 
proceedings for a wide range of criminal offences, on both conviction and acquittal. Although 
these orders were introduced as a remedy for ‘course of conduct’ harassment and stalking 
offences under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, they are increasingly being handed 
down as part of sentencing for non harassment and stalking offences. In 2017, 60% were 
issued on conviction for other offences (and as many as 70% in 2016). Five cases in our 
project police dataset were issued an RO as part of sentencing on conviction, all of them for 
non harassment and stalking offences: three for common assault, one for burglary, and one 
for criminal damage and assault. Our victim/survivor interviews show a similar picture, of 
ROs being used in sentencing for non-harassment and stalking offences. One interviewee told 
us that her partner received an RO alongside an eight week suspended sentence and a fine on 
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conviction for assault by battery. Another said that her partner was convicted for ABH, 
criminal damage and threats to kill, and was sentenced to two years’ prison (of which he 
served one), and a five-year RO. A third said that her partner was convicted for assault and 
battery and sentenced to a two-year RO and 40 hours unpaid community service. A fourth 
reported that her partner was sentenced to 18 months in prison on conviction, and a three-
year RO, which he immediately broke.   
 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
<Insert Table 1 here>  
 
Whilst most ROs are being issued in domestic violence cases, many seem to be handed down 
in criminal trials where a conviction for domestic violence offences of harassment or stalking 
either was not sought, or was not successful. This is of course in keeping with the intention 
that ROs should be protective - especially since the extension of scope in 2009 to allow 
judges to use them to manage domestic violence offenders - and it is positive that they are 
being used flexibly. However, it does also highlight ongoing problems with the ‘fit’ of the 
criminal justice system for domestic violence on two grounds: (a) it suggests that in domestic 
violence cases, bringing charges for ‘incident’ offences such as assault and criminal damage 
may still be being favoured over ‘pattern’ or ‘course of conduct’ offences such as harassment 
and stalking; and (b) in these convictions for ‘incident’ offences, judges are sufficiently 
concerned about the ongoing threat of further abuse to issue protection orders – suggesting 
that the violence was not a one-off incident. 
 
Breaches of ROs are being enforced, but instead of charging substantive offences? 
 
 18 
Ministry of Justice data show that breaches of ROs prosecuted as a calculated proportion of 
the number of ROs issued increased from 28% in 2011 to 48% in 2017 (table 2). Convictions 
for breach of RO have increased in tandem, from a calculated proportion of number of ROs 
issued of 25% in 2011 to 43% in 2017 (table 2). In 2017, 91% of defendants prosecuted for 
breach were convicted (1).  The Crown Prosecution Service observes that this increase in 
prosecutions for breach of RO coincides with a fall in prosecutions for harassment offences 
in 2017-18 compared with 2016-17 (CPS, 2018, p. A20). This pattern echoes previous studies 
which identified a police tendency to downgrade domestic abuse-related charges to breach 
(e.g. Douglas, 2008), or to downgrade DV in terms of the wider criminal justice system 
(Westmarland, McGlynn and Humphreys, 2018).  
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
Civil-led non-molestation orders 
Non-Molestation Orders remain in demand – despite criminalisation of breach in 2007 and 
changes to legal aid eligibility in 2013  
Ministry of Justice (MoJ) data present a contrary picture on NMOs to evaluations conducted 
in 2008 following the criminalisation of breach (Platt, 2008; Hester et al., 2008), which 
suggested there had been a downturn in use. Some domestic violence advocacy professionals, 
judiciary and courts staff interviewed by Hester et al. at that time expressed concern that 
fewer victims might pursue NMOs because of concerns about criminalising their partners. It 
is positive that this has turned out not to be the case. The Ministry of Justice data show a 
slight increase in non-molestation orders between 2007 and 2014, reversing the trend up to 
that point, with the number remaining constant since 2014, except for a 9% rise in the last 
year figures are available, to 2017 (figure 2 and table 1). 
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<Insert figure 2 here> 
 
This suggests that concerns that more NMO applications would be contested once breach was 
made a criminal offence (Burton, 2010; Hitchings, 2005) have proved unfounded. It may be 
that the initial drop in NMOs following criminalisation of breach in 2007 reflected teething 
difficulties with implementation. A wider lens is helpful here. Edwards (2001) shows that 
NMOs increased to 1993, then declined to 1997 when the Protection from Harassment Act 
was introduced. There was then a drop to 2000, an increase to 2002, and then a 15% decrease 
to 2006. This context, plus the new data presented here, suggests that the initial fall identified 
by studies in 2008 may have captured the tail end of the previous dip, coupled with initial 
disruption of changes to a new regime, rather than a longer-term decline in NMOs. 
 
It also shows that concerns that changes to legal aid financial eligibility which came in in 
2013 did not lead to an overall downturn in orders made for NMOs. In fact, NMOs issued 
went up by 8% during the year following the changes (2013 to 2014) and have remained 
more or less steady since (see figure 2). The data also does not support the alternative 
proposition regarding the effect of the LASPO Act: there was no dramatic rise in NMO 
applications or orders made following the changes in 2013, but rather a continuation of a 
modest upward trend with some annual fluctuations over time (figure 2). Survey evidence 
from 2014 found that 43% of women reporting domestic abuse could not ‘prove’ abuse. 
Where they did have proof, it was most commonly evidence from a healthcare professional, a 
MARAC or social services referral; only 10% reported having a civil order as evidence 
(Rights of Women, Women’s Aid and Welsh Women’s Aid, 2014). This further suggests that 
the concern that changes to legal aid could lead to a spike in false allegations has not 
materialised. Whilst the overall number of NMOs granted has remained fairly steady over 
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time, there is some evidence (reviewed below) of women continuing to face difficulties 
meeting the financial eligibility criteria for legal aid in applying for injunctions. 
 
Civil NMOs are valued by victims. Some 26% of the victims/survivors interviewed for the 
project reported having one or more protection orders, most commonly an NMO (15%, 
n=33). One victim/survivor reported that the threat of police enforcement of an NMO alone 
was effective in reducing abuse: 
Well he did breach [the NMO]. He did carry on ringing me and harassing me and that.  
But then when he got warned by the police, I’ve not heard nothing since. [case 095] 
 
Another said that the presence of an order was effective by creating some ‘space’ for all 
involved: 
I think it’s a really clear line in the sand… when they do break it, to take some action 
and get it taken seriously straight away […] And [the NMO] just gave us all a bit of 
space really. I think while they’re still in your head and talking to you, it’s really 
difficult to get a perspective on what’s happened to you.  But once he wasn’t in my 
head and I didn’t get his opinion on everything, and I didn’t get to hear how ill he was 
and how upset he was and how sad he was and how dreadful everything was, I think 
my sense of perspective came back [case 082]. 
Some victims reported specific barriers to obtaining NMOs 
Victim/survivor interviews for the project found some evidence of victims being prevented or 
discouraged from seeking NMOs for several reasons, including: solicitors’ advice that they 
might look ‘hostile in family proceedings, lack of evidence to ‘prove’ abuse, applications 
being downgraded to undertakings, and lack of affordability due to cuts in legal aid.   
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For instance, one was warned by her solicitor that it would look ‘hostile’ in a child contact -
related hearing in the family court, despite her ex-partner having been convicted in criminal 
court for harassment and having police bail conditions not to contact her: 
In the family court, my solicitor advised me not to [apply for an NMO] because it 
would make me look like I was hostile [case 049]. 
 
This plays into the wider issue of a mismatch in approaches to domestic violence between the 
family and criminal courts. Although steps have been taken to address this (e.g. Practice 
Direction 12J – Child Arrangements and Contact Orders: Domestic Abuse and Harm (2017)),  
research published in 2018 still found conflicts between the approaches in family and 
criminal court, with the former not always taking domestic abuse into account even when a 
conviction for domestic violence existed (Women’s Aid and Queen Mary University of 
London, 2018). 
 
In terms of barriers, several of our interviewees reported difficulties ‘proving’ domestic abuse 
sufficiently for courts to grant an order. For example, in one case the judge was reluctant to 
grant an NMO because the abuse was not physical: 
I got the non-mol, and then he had a chance to contest it, which he did, and he tried 
that, and he contested it.  And I had a real fight on my hands to put it in place. In the 
end the judge downgraded it to an undertaking, so for the last half of the year it was 
changed into an undertaking because the judge said that because there wasn’t any 
evidence of him having badly beaten me up or anything like that …and this is the 
judge’s own words, he said you know abuse needs to be very  bad for me to feel 




Another reported that she was not granted an NMO because she had not been to the police 
previously to report the abuse: 
 Basically we went in front of the judge and he said all this stuff about me in his 
witness statement calling me a drug addict, saying I had this crazy lifestyle, I was 
drinking a bottle and a half <of hard liquor> a day.  And because I had no proof 
because I’d never been to the police before or anything like that, the non-molestation 
order wasn’t granted.  And … it really really was awful.  He said that … the judge 
said that don’t go within so many yards of her, make a personal agreement, it’s called 
an overtaking … undertaking even … so I got that.  [case 064] 
 
One victim reported that her application was downgraded to an undertaking because the 
judge suggested the perpetrator would find it harder to contest: 
the day of the fact-finding hearing the judge said to me, you know if my findings go 
against you, the non-molestation order will be discharged immediately. However, if 
your husband agrees to sign an undertaking now and we have that instead of the non-
molestation order that will be binding regardless of what my findings are.  And so I 
kind of felt that I had to do that really, so an undertaking was written [case 111]. 
 
Several reported that lack of legal aid was a prohibiting factor to gaining a NMO: 
Legal Aid said that that wasn’t a persistent enough threat for me to qualify for Legal 
Aid to get a non-molestation order, so I couldn’t get one. [case 108] 
I spoke to my solicitor about getting like basically an injunction against him to say 
he's not allowed near my house because basically he won't listen when I ask him not 
to call and text my phone. Actually the more I ask him not to do it the more he does it. 
I spoke to my solicitor about that but basically my solicitor said that I wouldn't be 
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able to obtain Legal Aid for it, so I'd have to pay for it and even if I paid for it there 
was no guarantee the court would go for it.  
 
These examples show that, whilst overall, the number of NMOs granted do not seem to have 
fallen since the LASPO Act came into effect in 2013, individual women continue to have 
difficulties making their case for NMOs to be issued, in some cases due to difficulties 
meeting financial eligibility criteria for legal aid. 
 
Breach of NMO less likely to be acted upon than breach of RO? 
At the same time as a rise in prosecutions for breach of RO, prosecutions for breaches of 
NMOs have remained broadly steady since 2011, with around a quarter of the number issued 
being prosecuted for breach each year. This may suggest that, as well as more ROs being 
issued overall, breach of ROs is more likely to be pursued by police compared with breach of 
NMOs. There was some support for this in our interviews. Several reported breach of an 
NMO to the police but were told (incorrectly) that the police did not have the power to 
enforce NMOs, and so could not act unless the perpetrator ‘did something direct’, with 
stalking and harassment behaviour seemingly not being deemed enough in itself: 
He’s not meant to even come on my road, and even now he comes and parks right 
outside the house and everything. I’ve rung the police and they’ve said to me that I 
would need to take it back to court because they can’t really do anything because I’ve 
got the injunction and everything through the courts, not through the police. They said 
that because they’ve got no record of his behaviour, because they didn’t give me the 
injunction, that they can’t really do anything unless he’s a direct threat [case 029]. 
 
He still trails my oldest 16 year old walking down the road. The police know about it. 
The police care but they don’t care because they’re stuck. This court order (NMO) is 
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a civil matter…Unless he does something direct, which I’ve been told so many times, 
“Unless he hits your daughter–then we can do something” [case 310]. 
 
In December he turned up at the children’s nativity play. The police were absolutely 
fantastic [but] it was deemed that it was going to be a breach of the peace but they 
didn’t have anything to arrest him [case 067]. 
  
Two of eight cases in our project dataset of police domestic violence incidents had NMOs in 
place at the time of the incident, but police took No Further Action on the breach. In one, 
despite the NMO and a history of 19 previous recorded domestic violence incidents between 
the partners, the police judged this incident of harassment to be not a crime, with no offences 
disclosed, and did not take action for breach of the NMO. In the other, the male perpetrator 
had a police record for domestic and sexual violence against previous partners. There was an 
NMO in place, and the police crimed the incident as harassment, but could not locate the 
perpetrator to take any action against him.  
 
Both the victim/survivor interviews and police incidents provide further evidence of a 
divergence between police action to enforce breach of NMOs and breach of ROs, and suggest 
some confusion amongst police over their powers to enforce breach of NMOs. Hitchings 
(2005) suggested there was a danger that ‘trivial’ breaches of non-molestation orders will not 
be top of the police’s priority list and therefore ‘criminalising breach of a non-molestation 
order may also have the (unintended) effect of not only failing to protect the victim, but of 
not achieving justice either’ (Hitchings, 2005, p.99). It seems this may be the case. 
 
Poor police data is preventing enforcement of civil NMOs 
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As well as confusion amongst officers about their powers of enforcement for breach of civil 
NMOs, we uncovered evidence that some police forces in England and Wales do not have 
adequate records of protection orders – especially NMOs. In 307 out of 400 police DV 
incidents (77%) analysed for the project, it was not known whether or not a protection order 
was in place. Given that at least a quarter of victims/survivors we interviewed reported 
having one or more protection orders (26%), it is likely that police data is not capturing a 
swathe of cases where orders are in place. Forces do not seem to be systematically recording 
(especially civil) protection orders. This is worrying, considering that breach of many of 
these protection orders is criminal. If the police are not aware that orders are in place, how 
can they enforce them? These findings provide further empirical evidence of the problem of 
police recording of civil orders identified by campaigners and individual police forces, which 
the current pilot of Practice Direction 36H is intended to address (Domestic Abuse Matters, 
2014; Practice Direction 36H – Pilot Scheme, Procedure for Service of Certain Protection 
Orders on the Police, 2018).  
 
Domestic Violence Protection Orders 
Use of DVPOs is hard to assess 
It is perhaps too early to be able to assess the use of DVPOs over time, since they only came 
in in 2014, but many fewer seem to be issued than either NMOs or ROs: around 3,000 to 
4,000 per year (HMICFRS, 2017). There is not yet a central reporting mechanism for data on 
these orders, so we are reliant on periodic police inspectorate reports which gather data direct 
from all the forces. Only 5% (n=10) of the victims/survivors interviewed for the project 
reported having a DVPN/DVPO, and only two out of the 400 police incidents analysed for 
our project reported use of one (but they only came in in 2014, the year incidents were 
sampled). Police inspections have however found that ‘many forces are still not using 
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DVPOs as widely as they could, and opportunities to use them continue to be missed’ 
(HMICFRS, 2017, p.25).  
 
DVPOs misused or not used 
Police guidance is clear that DVPOs should not be seen as a preferred alternative to criminal 
charge–rather, they were envisaged in circumstances where an arrest and charge is not 
possible (College of Policing, 2015). Yet in one of the two domestic violence incidents in our 
dataset in which a DVPO was issued, the police seemed to choose to use the order as an 
alternative to criming the incident and pursuing a criminal charge. This was a DV case 
involving a 17-year-old female victim and 20 year-old male partner. He physically assaulted 
her, and had a history of police call-outs for repeat domestic violence against her. The 
incident was not crimed; rather a DVPN was issued, followed by a DVPO [Police case 181].  
We also found evidence of police using DVPOs for high risk cases (a problem flagged by 
HMIC in its latest domestic abuse inspection report, HMICFRS, 2017). The second case in 
our police dataset was a high risk DV case involving a 26 year-old female victim and 39 year 
old male partner. He assaulted her and was charged with ABH. He had a police record of 
physical violence, rape, sexual assault against her on at least four previous incidents. She was 
police-flagged as vulnerable, there were children involved and the perpetrator had police 
flags for drugs, alcohol, and mental health. [Police case 292].  
 
We found some evidence of women and children still being expected to leave the home after 
domestic abuse – rather than DVPN/Os being used to keep the perpetrator out, as they were 
intended. For example, one interviewee reported: 
they said, well you’ve got an hour to get out of the house, because we’re about to go 
and release him on bail.  I said no shouldn’t you stop him from coming to the house.  I 
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mean I subsequently found out that they should have issued him with a domestic 
violence protection … or us with a protection notice to stop him coming to the house, 
but they failed on that.  ……  I then had to get a non-molestation order … pay to get a 
non-molestation order and an occupation order to get back in the house [case 004]. 
 
Overall, it is hard to assess whether the current regime is enabling more women and children 
to remain in the family home because data on DVPN/Os remains so poor (HMICFRS, 2017). 
 
Conclusions  
In England and Wales, the last ten years has seen a shift in approach to protection orders for 
domestic violence: from victim-led civil measures towards increasing civil-criminal 
hybridisation, a greater emphasis on orders issued in criminal proceedings, and handing 
greater responsibility for decision-making and enforcement to the police. There has also been 
an expansion in the number and range of orders available. The Government’s newly-
proposed DAPOs – hybrid criminal-civil orders which are intended to replace existing orders 
– are thus a natural continuation of this general trend in order design. 
 
Greater availability and use of protection orders, including hybrids, may be a double-edged 
sword. On the positive side, protection orders which can be issued on-the-spot or in a wide 
range of criminal and non-criminal contexts are welcome on several grounds. They extend 
the ‘toolkit’ available to the police to manage perpetrators. They give the chance for police to 
act without being fully reliant on the victim for evidence, sometimes at a lower (civil) burden 
of proof ‘on the balance of probabilities’, which may be a better fit with the nature of 
domestic violence offending. They make a statement to victims and perpetrators that the 
offence is severe and compliance will be enforced (Gore, 2007). Victims seem to welcome 
 
 28 
this (Hester et al., 2008). This paper finds that a greater range of orders are being used, more 
flexibly, to protect victims and manage perpetrators, and more breaches of ROs are being 
enforced. 
 
At the same time, there is an increasing divergence between ROs issued in criminal 
proceedings and civil-issued NMOs. This paper presents fresh evidence that victims still want 
civil options, especially NMOs.  Victims report barriers to obtaining NMOs for a range of 
reasons, including concerns about how they might ‘play out’ in family proceedings, lack of 
affordability due to legal aid cuts, and insufficient evidence to prove (especially physical) 
abuse. However, despite these individual barriers, and fears that criminalising breach (in 
2007) and cuts to legal aid (in 2013) might significantly affect victims’ access to NMOs, 
Ministry of Justice data on the number of orders made suggests that, whilst there have been 
short-term fluctuations, NMOs continue to be made in sizeable, and steadily increasing, 
numbers. 
 
Victims want civil-issued NMOs, then, but they also want the police to enforce breaches of 
those orders, which currently does not seem to be consistently the case. We found victims 
reported breaches of NMOs not being investigated or charged, with this picture underscored 
by confusion amongst police about their powers of arrest and enforcement when a civil NMO 
is breached, and a lack of systematic intelligence and data recording in police files to inform 
officers that civil orders are in place. This last point has been specifically identified as a 
problem in practice and attempts made to address it – for instance the Practice Direction 36H 
issued by Sir James Munby in July 2018, which proposed that the issuing court emails a 
central police address to notify them of the order; and protocols drawn up by individual 
police forces. Yet our evidence, from both victim reports and interrogation of police data, 
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suggests that there is still a lack of systematic communication of these orders to the police. 
This is particularly problematic since if the police have no formal notice that an order has 
been served, they have no powers to enforce it. The Domestic Abuse Bill  
gives the Government an opportunity to address this vital gap in current procedures and 
practice and make sure that police are routinely notified by the courts that an order has been 
made and served. This is particularly important given the potential for increased confusion 
during implementation of the proposed new DAPOs. 
 
In addition, whilst enforcement of breaches of ROs is to be welcomed, we are concerned that 
an increase in charges for breach may obscure a corresponding drop in charges for 
substantive offences – which attract higher penalties – being charged for DV (a conclusion 
supported by the CPS, 2017). Thus, a focus on breach may be having the inadvertent effect of 
downgrading domestic violence in criminal justice terms. This is supported by victims 
interviewed by Hester et al. (2008) who suggested that perpetrators were more likely to go to 
court for breach rather than alternative substantive criminal charges (e.g. assault), and by 
international evidence on the downgrading of criminal charges to breach charges in domestic 
violence cases (Douglas, 2008).  
 
Overall, it seems that a dual regime of protection orders has developed, with orders issued in 
criminal proceedings and by police privileged (and enforced) over victim-led civil orders, and 
the greater use of protection orders having an unintended consequence of downgrading 
domestic violence in criminal justice terms.  In this context the Government’s proposal to 
introduce a new, comprehensive Domestic Abuse Prevention Order in England and Wales, is 
very welcome: it is an opportunity to simplify and co-ordinate what has become a crowded 
field, and in particular to make sure that courts are joined-up. However, there is a danger that 
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rationalisation of existing orders risks just shuffling the deckchairs. Breaches, often multiple 
breaches, of protection orders are common, and police can be slow to respond or not take 
action at all – particularly with NMOs. This risks loss of victim confidence, potentially 
leading to under-reporting of breach. The right range of orders must exist, but must also be 
enforced.  
 
So, whilst the Government’s proposals for rationalising the current regime under a single, 
new, flexible Domestic Abuse Protection Orders are a welcome simplification, this paper’s 
findings raise a number of important questions the Government must address in 
implementing the measures in the Bill. Firstly, they should consider retaining a civil 
protection order option (NMO). It is clear from the data on increased numbers of NMOs 
made that victims continue to want civil orders, and previous studies have shown one reason 
is that they want to retain some control over whether to apply for an order against their (ex) 
partner. Whilst DAPOs will allow victims to apply, they can also be issued by police and 
third parties, and this risks continuing a pattern of disempowering victims by taking the 
decision to get an order out of their hands. It will be crucial, too, to review how victims’ 
wishes are taken into account in applications for, and the conditions attached to, DAPOs. 
Secondly, the Government should monitor the reasons courts reject applications for the new 
orders, to assess how significant a problem are the findings in this paper that some victims 
are unable to apply for orders due to ineligibility for, or unaffordability of, legal aid. Thirdly, 
with introduction of a new order it will be even more crucial to ensure real clarity amongst 
police about their powers to enforce breaches of all orders, and to ensure that when orders are 
made their existence is communicated by courts to police in order that they can enforce 
breach. Fourthly, the pattern identified in this paper is that breach of orders issued in criminal 
proceedings and made by the courts (ROs) are enforced over orders issued in civil 
 
 31 
proceedings and applied for by victims directly (NMOs) – if this pattern continued with the 
new DAPOs, it risks a parallel regime developing within the same order. Fifthly there is a 
renewed urgency for a commitment by the police and CPS (perhaps underpinned by national 
guidance) to prosecute substantive offences where these also constitute breach of an order, 
rather than only prosecuting for breach.  
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Table 1: Restraining Orders (ROs) and Non-Molestation Orders (NMOs) issued 2011 to 
2017 (Ministry of Justice data)1 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
ROs issued on conviction 
for harassment offences 
n/a 4,637 5,090 5,907 6,340 6,041 
 
6,820 
ROs issued on conviction 
for stalking offences 
n/a n/a 249 495 529 412 
 
941 
ROs issued on conviction 
for other offences 























ROs issued on acquittal 















Total ROs issued 19,123 20,059 20,325 21,472 23,021 25,249 
 
21,148 
NMOs made  
 
19,556 19,403  22,284 23,999 23,630 23,641 25,707 
 
Table 2: Prosecutions and convictions for breach of Restraining Orders and Non-
Molestation Orders, 2011-2017 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Total ROs issued (MoJ 
data) 
19,123 20,059 20,325 21,472 23,021 25,249 
 
21,148 
Breach of RO 
prosecuted (MoJ data) 






















Breach of RO convicted 
(MoJ data) 






















Breach of RO 
prosecuted (CPS data) 
8,733 10,275 11,681 13,559 15,384 16,614 17,012 
% prosecutions DA-
related 
72% 71% 76% 80% 85% 84% 87% 
NMOs made (MoJ data) 19,556 19,403  22,284 23,999 23,630 23,641 25,707 
Breach NMO 
prosecuted (CPS data) 




























1 RO data calculated from annual Crown Prosecution Service Violence Against Women and Girls Crime 
Reports (Stalking and Harassment data section), together with Ministry of Justice data on convictions for 
harassment and stalking offences made in the same (calendar) year. The latest data are for calendar year 2017. 




















2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Restraining Orders England and Wales
Total issued On conviction On acquittal
 
 40 
Figure 2: Non-molestation orders made in England and Wales, 2003-2018 
 
 
 
